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NETWORKS OF TECHNOLOGY ORIENTED FIRMS 
Tokio Suzuki 
The present ar!Icle is mtended to examine the role of external 
sources of scientific, technological, and market informat10n dissemmated 
through collaborat1on and mforma!Ion networks of innovative 
enterprises, and to give a game-theoretic formulation as to how a 
network is formed and maintained. 
I Empincal Results 
As a pmneer in the study of mnovative success, Schumpeter 
recognized the importance of iローhouseR&D act1V1ties, but neither went 
mto the mteract1on between the R&D and other func!Ions like finance, 
nor mter-corporate relations (Schumpeter, 1928) It was not until the 
1960s when systematic empmcal studies of innova!Ions were conduct-
ed, first about the manufacturmg sectors in the USA and Europe then 
several other mdustnes and countries. As summarized in Freeman 
(1991), successful projects, at least until the late 1970s, had the 
following salient features. 
First of al, successful innovators clearly identified specific needs on 
the user side, developed new technologies which can meet the 
requirements, and integrated the technologies through adequate 
internal communications Secondly, successful innovators also made 
considerable use of external sources of scientific and technological 
achievements, where the collaboration was mamly to complement the 
m house R&D, and the hnkages were pluralistic, namely with 
universities, government research mstitutes, and even competing firms. 
The collaboration itself is certainly not a new phenomenon. Just after 
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World War I, for example, a cooperative research association was 
established m the UK and other European countries, followed by joint 
projects in the American oil and chemical industnes around 1930, the 
Manhattan Project, etc. The classical cases can be characterized by 
preempted targets and the need to share financial and other risks, or to 
substitute inadequate internal R&D activities. On the other hand, the 
empincal studies in the 1960s and 1970s demonstrated that the 
collaboration was formed in the process of R&D activities rather 
spontaneously and informally, in order to mutually complement the 
indigenous achievements 
In Japan, the government provided in the 1960s financial and 
technological support to the immature industries hke computers, and it 
was in the 1970s when pnority was given to the development of 
electronic and information technology, later also new materials and 
biotechnology, as a genenc technology. The development was 
administered by the Science and Technology Agency and the Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry, and took the form of cooperatmn 
among the government research institutes, universities, and private 
companies, financed through special loans and tax benefits (Baba and 
Suzuki, 1991) The consortium-type pro1ects yielded many new 
technologies, and especially the achievements旧 theelectronic and 
information technology showed remarkable diffusion effects, and 
enhanced the development and produclion of electromc appliances, 
automobiles, etc (Imai and Baba, 1990) 
The apparent success in Japan soon lead to emulation m the USA 
and Europe as to the organization and funding, and the number of 
inter-corporate activities hke joint R&D projects, cross licensing, and 
subcontracting began to increase rapidly after 1980, especially in relation 
to information technology, and the linkages have often been formed 
internationally (Freeman, 1991). Recognizing the strong impact of the 
information technology, Imai and Baba (1989) point out that since the 
early 1980s, innovatmn mechamsm has become highly systemic That 
1s, the advanced informat10n technology has affected, not only functions 
within each firm, such as design, production, and administration, al 
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oomputerized, but also have established very efficient and dense 
. nformation networks among the firms and users As a result, 1! has 
become possible to exchange unfam1har technolog1es easily and to 
reduce lead times, and moreover, it 1s essential to contact even 
competing firms because of the accelerating pace of technological 
change and wide range of specialized technologies for each R&D 
activity. 
Furthermore, as noted by Imai and Baba (1989), it is also common to 
use the inter-corporate relations for strategic purposes, and the nsk 
aversion like cost sharing no longer plays an important role In order to 
classify the strategies, 1t would be appropriate to see the following 
cases. The first category aims at entering an existing market, or 
creating a new one As an affiliated company of Fujitsu, a Japanese 
computer manufacturer, Fanuc had inherited necessary technologies for 
the numerical control machinery, namely specialized in data processing 
systems and servo mechanisms. Then, tnggered by the movements 
toward factory automation with order-made robots and equipments m 
the early 1980s, Fanuc decided around 1985 to produce factory robots 
and enhance the software capability. The company established a joint 
venture with General Motors, with the purpose of introducing the 
advanced factory automat10n into GM’s product10n lmes Fanuc supplied 
order made robots and controlling software, while GM designed the 
total production system operated by main frames In this way, though 
not a large firm with diverse technological assets, Fanuc entered the 
factory robot business 
Another example is Nintendo, a Japanese producer of household use 
game machines with a data processing unit In the mid-1980s, the 
company contacted security companies and NTT, a telecommumcaltons 
enterprise, and developed Jointly on-line stock trading services, where 
the game machines work as a terminal. It is expected that after the 
ful scale introduction of the digital informalton networks, many other 
services hke banking wil also be provided in a s1m1lar manner. 
Secondly, m order to obtain a dominant market share, which can lead 
to considerable externalities, company groups can be formed on the 
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basis of different product concepts and specifications. The development 
process of video cassette recorders (VCRs) m Japan, examined by Imai 
and Baba (1990), gives a typical example. The development is 
origmated from basic specifications called the U Matic by Sony and 
further R&D achvit1es by the company, Japan Victor Corporation (JVC), 
and Matsushita smce 1970. The companies conducted inter-corporate 
R&D through cross licensing, free access to patents, etc The 
manufacturers managed to sel U-Matic VCRs to broadcasting stations, 
but the products were too costly and difficult to operate for general 
users 
In order to develop a VCR for household use, the companies took 
different measures Sony developed the Beta format, but JVC was 
developing a different format, namely VHS, and so was Matsushita In 
1975, Sony released the first models on the Beta format, followed by a 
product by Matsushita, but none sold well. The reason was that 
Matsushita’S product was of low quahty, and Sony’s Beta had the 
recording capacity of only one hour, despite better picture quality 
Realizing that most users wil utdize a VCR to record TV programs, 
especially spor恒 andmovies, JVC released a VHS formatted VCR at a 
lower price and ・with two hour recording capacity. On the other hand, 
while Sony was confident of the technological superionty and reluctant 
to cooperate with other firms, JVC was willing to supply the products 
to any partner on the original equipment manufacturing (OEM) basis, 
namely allow selling the product under the partner’s brand name The 
marketing strategy is profitable for both parties, because JVC can fully 
utilize the economies of scale, and the partner can earn some 
“entrepreneur’s profits”and learn new technologies. In addition, 1t will 
be seen that the prevadmg market pos1hon can yield remarkable 
externalities. By 1977, Hitachi, Sharp, and Mitsubishi Electnc completed 
an OEM contract with JVC, and Matsushita decided to introduce the 
VHS format. It should be noted that at least Hitachi and Matsushita 
entered into negotiations with Sony first, and decided to join the VHS 
side after realizing that VHS-formatted VCRs are suitable for mass 
production at low costs, apart from the long recording capac此y Sony 
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managed to make a contract wrth Toshiba, Sanyo, and NEC as a 
countermeasure 
This was followed by a similar competition rn the USA. In 1977, 
Sony completed an OEM contract with Zenith, started negotiations with 
RCA, and announced that a low priced VCR on Beta wil soon come 
onto the market, and it wil have a recording capacity of two hours 
Matsushita reacted immediately, and gave an offer to RCA, stating 
that the company wil deliver a VHS-formatted VCR with four“hour 
recording capacity, long enough to record an American football game, 
m the near future. RCA showed great interest, and Matsushita was 
successful in producing the desired VCR in six months, thanks to the 
large, competent engineer corps and accumulated production 
technologies. RCA completed an OEM contract with Matsushita, and 
established a dominant market position, partly due to RCA’s mgemous 
price setting. 
In 1982, the market share of VHS formatted VCRs attained 60%, and 
exp叩 dedmonotonically, because an increasing number of video movies 
on VHS came into the market. The relationship between the market 
share of VHS and video software on that format was thus a reciprocal 
process of externahties. This also affected the existing market order of 
VCRs Phihps and Grundig gave up their format and introduced VHS 
m 1983, and Toshiba, Sanyo, and NEC, al members of the Beta side, 
announced to produce VCRs on VHS. Zenith joined the VHS side in 
1984, and finally Sony started to produce VHS-formatted VCRs m 
1988 Since the mid-1980s, Sony has promoted the development of 
video cameras on the 8mm standard. The present VCR business seems 
to be at a relatively stable, niche stage That is, most users would 
prefer a compact 8mm video camera for outdoor recording, and watch 
video movies and TV programs by using a console VCR on VHS. 
Apart from the above cases, it is well-known that a simrlar 
competition is underway as to the operating system of personal 
computers and specifications of the high defmit10n television (Baba and 
Suzuki, 1991) The empirical results suggest that a network of 
technology oriented frrms is a loosely-coupled, spontaneous organizat10n 
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in the form of technological cooperation, JOmt ventures, and OEM 
contracts The purpose is to enter or create a market, and to estabhsh 
a dominant position, where technological aspects such as formats and 
specifications play a crucial role In the next section, inter-corporate 
relations concerning an OEM contract wil be discussed as a typical 
case, and a general negotiation model wil be introduced to formulate 
the process 
I A Game-Theoretic Formulation 
As shown in the empincal studies, there are in general more than 
one manufacturer producing slightly different products like a VCR on 
Beta or VHS, and the manufacturers seek for an OEM partner, in 
order to attain a dominant market position Furthermore, due to a 
certain time lag of R&D, some firms would bring new products earher 
than others, although the quality may differ. On the other hand, it 
would be natural for an OEM applicant to contact the early comers 
first, in order to secure some“entrepreneuer’s profitsぺratherthan wait 
for others and give an auction-style offer. This situation can be 
formulated by using a model of wage negot1at1ons by Shaked and 
Sutton (1984), where the basic settings are from Rubinstein (1982) 
Let firm I and 2 be the manufacturers Suppose that firm I released 
a new product and entered mto negotiations with firm A. an OEM 
applicant, concerning how to divide profit per unit, so the quantity 
delivered 1s assumed to be fixed, and after T penods, firm 2 brought a 
different product into the market, where T 1s an mteger and given at 
the moment Furthermore, it 1s also assumed that firm A mtends to 
make an OEM contract with only one of the manufacturers, free to 
switch to firm 2 once T periods have elapsed, provided that firm A 
has received a counter-offer, if any, by firm I, can return to firm I 
after receiving a counter-offer by firm 2, and mformat10n is complete 
for every player. 
Following the Rubinstein model, the negotiations between firm A and 
I proceed as follows, where the profit is assumed to be one, and no 
player reserves any minimum share. At the first stage, namely t=i. 
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firm A offers p, O；玉p壬I,to firm I. and if ftrm I accepts the offer, the 
game ends. Firm A receives p, and I -p ts the payoff to firm I. 
Otherwise, firm I gives a counter-offer p’at t=2, and if firm A 
accepts the offer, it receives d (I-p’）， and firm I dp’， where d, 
OくdくI.ts a discount factor due to the delay, and is assumed to be 
given and common to al the players 
More prectsely, let S=[O, I], and F be the strategy set of firm A or, 
in general. any player offermg first F consists of al sequences of 
functions f= {!,}. t be a natural number, such that f1 is an element of 
S, £,: S' I→ S, t odd, and f,: S＇→｛ y, n}. t even, and y means the 
acceptance and n rejection The strategy set G of firm I and 2, or, in 
general, any player offering secondly, c叩 bedefined in a simdar 
manner Concerning the equilibrium concept, it was demonstrated in 
the same article by Rubmstein that the Nash Eqmhb~tum ts too weak, 
and the Perfect Equilibrium can be a reasonable concept, at least m 
the present context. The strategy pair (fぺg勺inF×G is defmed to be 
a Perfect Equilibrmm in the negotiations between firm A and I. if the 
followmg cond1ttons are satisfied: 
For al sequences of offers (si. ・， sT).T odd, 
I) There is no f in F such that the profit partition based on (f* I 
Si. , sT. f), namely P(f* I Si... , ST, f), ts better than P(f* I s1,. , 
ST, gヰISi. . , s,)for firm I. f* I si. , ST means f* given the 
sequence of rejected offers (si. . , ST). 
2) If gT*(si. . , s,)=y, there is no fin F such that P(f*ls1, , sT, f) 
1s better than 1-sT, at t=T. for firm I 
3) If gT*(Si, ・， ST)= n, then P(f* I s1,. , ST,g* I s1, , sT) is equal 
to or better than 1-sT. at t = T,for firm I. 
Simdarly, for T even, 
4) There is no f inF such that P(f. g* Is, . , sT)is better than P(fキ｜
s1, . , ST,g* Is, . , sT)for firm A. 
5) If h*(si.. , sT)=y, there 1s no fin F such that P (f, g*ls1, 
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sT.) 1s better than sT, at t=T, for firm A. 
6) If h*(s,, , sT)= n, then P(f叶S, , ST, g掌Is,. , sT)is equal to 
or better than sT, at t=T, for hrm A 
Concernmg the negotiat10ns among the firms I, 2, and A, further 
remarks should be made First, firm A can enter mto negotiations with 
firm 2 immediately 1! T 1s odd, but this wil not occur, because if firm 
A does so, it must receive a counter・ offer by firm 2 before returning 
to firm !, and therefore the switch to firm 2 isworse than staying with 
firm I for one more round. So T can be assumed to be even. 
Secondly, once A has switched to firm 2, it 1s in fact disadvantageous 
to return to firm I because of the discount factor. 
Then, as a direct application of the results by Shaked and Sutton, 
the followmg statements can be proved, where G represents any 
negotiation initiated by firm A, such as the original game between firm 
A and I, as well as any subgame given an even number of rejected 
offers, and G" represents any negotiation mitiated by hrm I or 2 
Lemma 
Let M and M" be the suprema of the payoffs to firm A in any 
Perfect Equdibnum of G and G" respectively Then the following must 
be the relationship between M and M" 
a) M'=max[d(J-d +dM可， Ml
b) M=[(J-dT刊）／(1-d)]+d弓r
Proof 
Consider a) If the game ends by t=T, firm A receives at most M 
by defm1tion. Other、N!Se, firm A can switch to firm 2 at t=T, 
immediately after receiving an offer by hrm I, and receive at most M, 
or rem am with firm I and receive at most M" at t = T十2,namely 
d(J -d(J-M')) discounted at t=T Next, consider b). Firm A can 
receive at most M" startmg from t=T, namely 1-d(l-M') discounted 
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at t=T-1. and repeating T times, the discounted value at t=l is 
equal to the summalton ( dY l十drM•, 1=1. , T+I This completes 
the proof 
Theorem 
The game G has a unique Perfect Equilibrium partition, and the 
payoff to firm A is: 
M=(l-dT刊）／（！+d)(l-dワ
Proof 
From the lemma M' ;;;M must hold, and this contradicts the case 
that firm A remains with firm I after t=T 
Remark I 
If T approaches to I. the game becomes almost an auction, and Firm 
A receives most of the profits On the other hand, 1! T goes to 
inf in町， M approaches to lパI+d), a b!lateral monopoly case If d goes 
to I. M approaches to (I/2)((T+ IνT). If the discount factor d, for the 
game between firm A and 2 issmaller than the factor d1 for the game 
between firm A and I, d1(1-d1+d1M') can be larger than M,, where 
M, 1s the spremum of the payoffs to firm A in any game between firm 
A and 2, 1mtiated by firm A’and under the discount factor d, In this 
case, firm A remains with firm I, and M' = d./(1 +d1) and M = 1/(1 +d,) 
follow Otherwise, M,=M=M'. and firm A switches to f1rm 2 
Remark 2: 
Based on the observation of car manufacuturers in the USA and 
Japan, Helper and Levine (1991) also formulated a Rubinstein-style 
model, and showed that a decline in fmal product market rents wdl 
mduce long-lasting supplier relations and yield relation-specific rents. 
The discussion could be extended to other cases hke the cross Iicensmg 
among manufacturers of electronic appliances, resulted from a change 
m the fmal-product market. 
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ハイテク企業のネットワークに関して
〈要約〉
鈴木時男
本稿においては，まず Imaiand Baba (1989, 1990）による調査などに基づ
いて， 'lit子機器関連分野を中心に日本並びに欧米各国のハイテク企業が外
部の研究機関，さらに競争企業聞で共同研究開発活動が行われている事を
概観L，このようなネットワークがどのような効果を持っかが分析される。
次に，いわゆる OEM契約を具体例として，企業聞のネットワーク形成
活動が交渉の観点から理論モデルで考察される。原型として， Rubinstein
(1982）の交渉モデル，さらにこの応用である Shakedand Sutton (1984）の
複数労働者との賃金交渉モデルが用いられている。なお，クロ兄・ライセ
ンシYグなどの議論は稿を改めて行う予定である。
